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David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
One of  the  most important components  of  the balance  sheet of  a property- 
casualty insurance company is the loss reserve. In spite of what the term may 
suggest, a loss reserve is not a pot of funds set aside for the uncertain future. 
It is an accounting entry, a liability on the balance sheet. More precisely termed 
the unpaid-losses account, the loss reserve expresses the amount the company 
expects to pay out in the future to cover indemnity payments that will come 
due on policies already written for losses that have already been incurred and 
to cover the costs of dealing with the associated claims. The latter category of 
costs, which includes, for example, the litigation costs associated with settling 
claims, is called loss-adjustment expenses.  I 
If  loss reserves  were  determined  solely  on  the  basis  of  pure  insurance- 
accounting theory, they would reflect only those factors that affect the size, 
frequency, and pattern of future claim payments and loss-adjustment expenses. 
Such factors  would  include changes  in patterns  of  actual claim payments; 
changes in inflation rates, weather patterns, and technology; and, particularly 
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significant in the context of liability insurance, trends in tort doctrines and jury 
awards. In practice, however, loss reserves are influenced by other considera- 
tions as well, considerations such as how the reported reserves will affect the 
likelihood of regulatory scrutiny, the perceptions of investors, and the firm’s 
income tax liability. In this paper, we begin to examine the effects of income 
tax rules on property-casualty reserving practices. 
Although insurers can choose from a number of different approaches to cal- 
culating their loss reserves, all these approaches share some common charac- 
teristics. The insurer generally begins by collecting information about its own 
loss experience as well as information about the rest of the industry’s loss expe- 
rience. With respect to the latter, industrywide data are collected and distrib- 
uted to insurers through rating bureaus such as the Insurance Services Organ- 
ization. These data  include information  about  the  severity, frequency, and 
timing of past claim payments and claim-expense payments as well as informa- 
tion about changes in trends and patterns of payments. 
Once these data have been collected, the insurer’s actuarial department ap- 
plies various statistical techniques designed to generate predictions about the 
insurer’s future loss claim payments and loss expenses. Typically, the actuarial 
department will recommend a range of  loss reserves. Then, from within this 
range, someone in management (e.g., the chief financial officer) will choose 
the actual number that will be reported on the insurer’s books. In any event, 
the choice of the reported loss reserve inevitably rests with management, and 
it is undisputed that management has some measure of discretion in setting 
those reserves (Peterson 1981). 
In thinking about the role played by  reserves as liabilities in the financial, 
regulatory, and tax accounting of the insurance company, it is useful to keep in 
mind the generic connection between a balance sheet and an income statement. 
In general terms, income, a flow concept, equals the sum of the increase in an 
associated stock concept, which is net worth, and amounts distributed to the 
company’s owners during a given period. And net worth is the excess of  a 
company’s total assets over its total liabilities at a given time. For reporting 
purposes, the flow concept (income) is recorded on the income statement, and 
the stock concept (net worth) is recorded on the balance sheet. Thus, in theory, 
a company’s reported income for a given period is simply the increase in the 
company’s net worth during the period.  (If there is a distribution to owners 
during the period, this statement is modified in an obvious way.) As for the 
specialized case of insurance accounting, the concept of net worth is called 
surplus, and it is reported on the insurer’s year-end balance sheet as the dif- 
ference between total assets and total liabilities. Likewise, net changes in sur- 
plus are reflected on the insurer’s income statement as an operating gain or 
loss. 
This is where an insurer’s loss reserves come into the picture. Loss reserves 
are typically the largest single liability on an insurer’s balance sheet. Therefore, 
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loss reserves can significantly affect an insurer’s surplus (i.e., the company’s 
stock picture) and its operating results or income (i.e., the company’s flow pic- 
ture). 
State insurance regulators specify the accounting conventions that insurance 
companies must  use in the reports that they  file for purposes of regulatory 
oversight. Collectively, these conventions are known as annual statement or 
statutory accounting. Statutory accounting has traditionally required-and,  in 
most states, still requires-that  loss reserves be reported on an undiscounted 
basis, both on the balance sheet and on the income statement. That is, despite 
the fact that an insurer’s loss reserves represent the insurer’s expected future 
claim payments and loss expenses, which one might expect to be discounted 
to a present-value equivalent, statutory accounting requires the insurer to cal- 
culate the balance-sheet entry using the simple sum of those future outlays. 
In addition, until 1986, insurers were required to use statutory accounting- 
including undiscounted loss-reserve calculations-for  the purpose of calculat- 
ing their federal income tax liability. As part of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 
(TRA86), however, insurers were required to discount their loss reserves for 
federal tax purposes. The details and the importance of this change are dis- 
cussed below. 
In the modern view of the firm, managers are modeled as making managerial 
decisions that serve their own interests. These interests will coincide with the 
interests of the firm’s owners if the managers are appropriately socialized or if 
appropriately structured compensation schemes are in place (Fama 1980; Jen- 
sen and Meckling  1976). The management of  an insurance company has an 
interest in the results reported  on the company’s balance  sheet and income 
statement. Additionally, with respect to some elements of the balance sheet 
and income statement, management has considerable discretion. That is, for 
such accounting elements, the information that is available to management re- 
garding the company’s performance and financial position  does not translate 
automatically into accounting data that can be reported. For these elements, 
the exercise of  managerial judgment is not only feasible but necessary. The 
insurer’s loss reserve is one such accounting variable, the setting of which can 
be understood as a managerial decision. 
In addition to playing an essential role in determining the insurer’s annual 
financial and tax-accounting income, loss reserves are used in measuring an 
insurer’s overall financial strength. All else equal, including a fixed and positive 
relation between reported loss reserves and a “best estimate” of future payment 
liabilities, a larger loss reserve is associated with an increased risk of the insur- 
er’s insolvency. If this risk becomes sufficiently large, state insurance regula- 
tors may increase their level of surveillance or intervene in some way. State 
regulators monitor specifically the insurer’s ratio of surplus to premiums writ- 
ten. If  this ratio falls below a given threshold, the regulator will require that 
steps be taken by the company to improve its financial position. In the extreme 
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the company and run it. For obvious reasons, the financial condition of  the 
insurer is also important to investors and to policyholders. In fact, from the 
point of view of insurance-company management, perhaps the most important 
consumer for the company’s accounting data is the commercial rating agencies, 
such as A. M. Best and Standard & Poor’s, whose ratings regarding  a com- 
pany’s financial condition can be critical to the company’s future prospects. 
In sum, because loss reserves play an important role in determining insurers’ 
reported income and surplus, one would expect management’s reserving dis- 
cretion to be affected by all the external factors mentioned above. 
The exercise of discretion in reporting reserves has been studied by a num- 
ber of previous researchers. Within this literature, perhaps the most commonly 
tested question is the extent to which insurers deliberately manipulate loss re- 
serves to “smooth” (i.e., to reduce the variability in) earnings over time (see, 
eg., Forbes  1970; Balcarek  1975; Ansley  1979, and Harrington  1988). This 
question was studied, for example, by Smith (1980) and Weiss (1985) in the 
context of automobile-liability lines of insurance. Both concluded that their 
findings were consistent with the smoothing hypothesis; both also suggested 
other possible causes of the reserving errors observed in their data, for ex- 
ample, unanticipated inflation. Grace (1990) carried out a similar study of loss- 
reserving errors. Grace hypothesized that management would choose loss re- 
serves that maximize the company’s discounted after-tax cash flow subject to 
smoothing constraints  and uncertainty. Looking at automobile-liability lines 
from the period between 1966 and 1979, Grace, too, concluded that the results 
of her study were largely consistent with her hypothesis. More recently, Petroni 
(1992) explored the hypothesis that the incentive to underestimate loss reserves 
is a decreasing function of the financial strength of the insurer. The results of 
this study suggest that insurance companies that are close to receiving regula- 
tory scrutiny tend to understate their reserves by  a larger amount than other 
insurance companies. 
Our interest in loss-reserving practices began with our realization that major 
changes in the federal income tax laws enacted in  1986 altered dramatically 
(although temporarily) the loss-reserving incentives  of property-casualty  in- 
surers. Specifically, TRA86 changed the tax treatment of property-casualty in- 
surance companies in ways that greatly increased the tax advantage of “conser- 
vative” loss reserving during the transition period from the pre-TRA86 world 
to the post-TRA86 world. (Conservative loss reserving is the reporting of loss 
reserves that fall systematically on the high end of the distribution of possible 
outcomes.) Thus, we were interested in exploring empirically how responsive 
insurers’ loss-reserving discretion is to tax incentives. 
Our study of the effect of taxes on loss reserving can be located within two 
established lines of inquiry. First, in the accounting literature, several research- 
ers have attempted to determine the extent to which external incentives affect 
management’s use of  its accounting discretion in reporting earnings. For ex- 
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White (1970), Dascher and Malcolm (1970), Koch (1981), Lambert (1984), 
Moses (1987), McNichols and Wilson (1988), and Scholes, Wilson, and Wolf- 
son (1990). Second, our research contributes to the study of  the effect of  tax 
law and tax-law changes on business decisions more generally. For a sampling 
of the enormous literature on this subject, see Slemrod (1992), which includes 
a collection of  empirical studies of the effects of TRA86 on various types of 
business decisions. 
Section 7.1 describes the relevant tax-law history and sketches out some of 
our hypotheses concerning reserving behavior. Section 7.2 gives some descrip- 
tive statistics on the industry. Section 7.3 develops a quantitative measure of 
the tax incentives bearing on the reserving decision. Section 7.4 looks at the 
time-series evidence in industrywide data. There is a brief concluding section. 
7.1  Income Tax Treatment of Property-Casualty Insurance Companies 
The tax treatment of property-casualty insurance companies is governed by 
a special set of rules that are found in subchapter L of  the Internal Revenue 
Code. Under these rules, property-casualty  insurers are required to calculate 
their taxable income using essentially the same accounting conventions re- 
quired by state insurance regulators, referred to, as we have noted, as statutory 
or annual statement accounting. The statutory approach requires an insurer to 
calculate its annual income by taking into account both its net underwriting 
profit (or loss) and its net investment income (or loss) for the year. To determine 
its underwriting profit or loss, the insurer starts with the premiums accruing 
during the year and then takes a number of deductions, the largest of which is 
typically the increase in the insurer’s incurred losses account, which, in turn, 
includes any increases in unpaid loss reserves. Note also that annual statement 
accounting requires insurers to treat loss-reserve increases and loss-reserve de- 
creases symmetrically. Thus, if an insurer has a net decrease in its loss reserves 
during the course of the year, the insurer must include the amount of that de- 
crease in its underwriting profits for the year.  (An increase in the estimated 
total of losses incurred and loss-adjustment expenses for policies that were 
written before the current reporting year is known as a reserve strengthening. 
A downward adjustment in those estimates is known as a reserve weakening 
or release. 
Given the availability of  the loss-reserve deduction for federal income tax 
purposes, an insurer will often have a tax incentive to overstate its loss reserves. 
This is because overstating the reserve will increase the deduction and reduce 
the insurer’s taxable income for the year. To be sure, that reduction comes at 
the cost of an equal increase in a future year’s taxable income; nevertheless, in 
the meantime, the insurer will have benefited from the time value of the excess 
deduction. (As we explain below, owing to the transition provisions of TRA86, 
there was an extra advantage for reserves in 1986 and 1987 and possibly for 
reserves in earlier years as well.) Of course, tax effects are not the only source 280  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
of incentives operating on the reserving decision. In some years, for example, 
management may have an interest in understating the insurer’s loss reserves so 
as to boost reported financial earnings. In addition, any tendency to overstate 
reserves will be constrained to some extent by the threat of increased scrutiny 
by state regulators or by the Internal Revenue Service. (If a loss-reserve deduc- 
tion is unreasonably large, the unreasonable amount of  the deduction can be 
disallowed by the IRS [Treas. Reg. sec. 1.832-4(b)].) 
TRA86 contained at least three provisions that should have significantly af- 
fected management’s incentives with respect to loss reserving: First, TRA86 
enacted the largest reduction in corporate income tax rates ever. Under the act, 
the corporate rate was scheduled to decline from 46 percent in  1986, to 40 
percent in 1987, and, finally, to 34 percent in 1988. Second, TRA86 introduced 
the requirement that, in calculating loss-reserve deductions and inclusions for 
federal income tax purposes, insurers must discount loss reserves to present 
value.*  Third, TRA86 included a special “fresh-start” transitional rule that ap- 
plied to pre-1987 loss reserves, under which insurers were permitted to write 
down their end-of- 1986 reserves to the discounted amount. Reserve increases 
due to strengthening in 1986 of pre-1986 reserves were, however, not eligible 
for the fresh start. 
The opportunities that were created by the tax rate changes to reduce effec- 
tive tax burdens are straightforward. Overstating loss reserves (i.e., reporting 
“conservative” reserves) is a method of postponing taxable income. Thus, any 
dollar of taxable income that was postponed from 1986 to 1987 or from 1987 
to 1988 would have generated $.06  in tax savings (not including the usual bene- 
fit of deferral). 
The fresh-start rule enacted in conjunction with the discounting requirement 
also created possibilities for reducing taxes by adjusting reserves. Under the 
fresh-start provisions, insurers could take loss-reserve deductions in pre- 1987 
tax years at their undiscounted value, while the corresponding inclusions in 
income in post-1987 tax years were on a discounted basis. The net effect was 
to provide a second deduction (deferred in time to a degree depending on the 
length of the payout tail on the line in question) for the difference between the 
discounted and the undiscounted total of reserves carried into the new regime 
on 1 January 1987. (The length of the tail of an insurance policy is the span of 
time from issue until all payments have been made.) Congress recognized that 
the fresh-start provision would give insurers an incentive to exercise their loss- 
reserving discretion so as to increase the amount of their loss reserves eligible 
for the fresh start. That is why the law expressly disallowed the application of 
2. The discount rate and loss-payment pattern that insurers must use in discounting their reserves 
are promulgated by the Treasury Department. Under certain circumstances, an insurer may elect 
to use its own historical loss-payment pattern. TRA86 also contained several other changes that 
specifically altered the tax treatment of  property-casualty insurers. For a discussion of  some of 
these changes and an investigation of their effects on insurers’ investment strategies, see Curnmins 
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the fresh-start rule to reserve strengthening that occurred in the 1986 tax and 
reporting year. (For most insurers, the concepts tux year and reporting year 
coincide.) Under this rule, to the extent that an insurer increased its loss re- 
serves in the 1986 tax year in a way that was deemed to be a reserve strengthen- 
ing by  the IRS, the insurer would in effect be required to treat that reserve 
strengthening as if it had been made in 1987, under the new discounting rules. 
To be more precise, the insurer would be permitted to deduct the undiscounted 
value of the reserve strengthening in the 1986 tax year, but it would also be 
required to return the amount of the discount into income in the 1987 tax year 
(Treas. Reg. 1.846-3[e]). Thus, insurers could increase the amount qualifying 
for the fresh-start advantage by increasing reported reserves on new policies 
written in  1986 and by  increasing reserves on all other policies in  1985 or 
earlier. For example, if an insurer overstated its loss reserves in the 1986 tax 
year for policies written in 1986 and corrected the overstatement in some post- 
1986 reporting year, the initial loss-reserve deduction would have been taken 
at the larger, undiscounted value, and the later loss-reserve inclusion (resulting 
from the corresponding weakening of the overstated reserve) would have oc- 
curred at the smaller, discounted value. The fresh-start rule implied a similar 
incentive to overstate loss reserves in pre- 1986 tax years, to the extent that 
companies anticipated the enactment of the discounting req~irement.~ 
7.2  The Industry: Descriptive Statistics 
The lines of insurance that are offered by property-casualty insurance com- 
panies can be described in a number of different ways. For the purposes of this 
paper, we use the five lines set out in table 7.1, which are the categories that 
were used by the industry before 1989. 
3. The requirement that property-casualty loss reserves be discounted for federal income tax 
purposes was first proposed in June 1983 in a hearing before the Senate Finance Committee. The 
proposal was put forward both by the Treasury Department (see Chapoton 1983) and by the Gen- 
eral Accounting Office (see Mavens 1983). Comments on the proposal were received at the same 
hearing from members of the insurance industry, including representatives of the American Insur- 
ance Association, the National Association of Independent Insurers, and the Alliance of American 
Insurers and representatives of a number of large insurance companies. The discounting require- 
ment appeared then in 1984 as part of the Treasury Department’s report to the president (“Treasury 
I”; see U.S. Treasury Department  1984). Subsequently, in President Reagan’s  1985 tax-reform 
proposal (“Treasury II”; see U.S. Treasury Department 1985). a proposal was included that would 
have had the same effect as the discounting requirement proposed by the Treasury Department and 
by the General Accounting Office. Earlier in 1985, the GAO had published its report calling for, 
among other changes, the introduction of the discounting requirement (see US. General Account- 
ing Office 1985). Finally, a provision quite similar to the Treasury Department and GAO proposals 
was enacted as part of TRA86. The proposal to reduce the top marginal corporate income tax rate 
from 46 percent ultimately to 33 percent also appeared in both Treasury I and Treasury 11. 
In related research, Logue (1996) examines the extent to which, in the period leading up to 
TRA86, the news of these two tax-reform proposals-the  discounting requirement and the reduc- 
tion in corporate tax rates-may  have affected insurers’ loss-reserving decisions and, in turn, the 
pricing and availability of some lines of insurance. This period roughly corresponded in time with 
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Table 7.1  Line Abbreviations 
MI 
AL  Automobile liability 
WC  Workers’ compensation 
OL  Other liability 
MM  Medical malpractice 
“Miscellaneous”: farmowner’s, homeowner’s, and commercial multiple 
peril, ocean marine, aircraft (all perils), and boiler and machinery 
Note:  In the pre-1989 statements, data for these lines were reported in the following parts of 
Schedule P: 1A (automobile liability), 1B (other liability), IC  (medical malpractice), ID  (workers’ 
compensation), and  I E (farmowner’s multiple peril, homeowner’s multiple peril, commercial mul- 
tiple peril, ocean marine, aircraft [all perils], and boiler and machinery) (our “miscellaneous” line). 
After 1988, the same lines were reported as follows: 1A (homeowner’s/farmowner’s), 1B (private 
passenger automobile liabilityhnedical),  1  C (commercial automobile/truck liability/medical), 1  D 
(workers’ compensation),  1E (commercial multiple peril),  1  F (medical malpractice), 1G (special 
liability [ocean marine, aircraft (all perils), boiler and machinery]), 1H (other liability). To put the 
later data in the same categories as the earlier data, lines 1B (privage passenger automobile liabil- 
ityhedical) and 1C (commercial automobile/truck liability/medical) of the 1989 form were added 
together to match the pre-1989 line 1A (automobile liability). Lines 1A (homeowner’s/farmown- 
er’s), IE (commercial multiple peril), and 1G (special liability [ocean marine, aircraft (all perils), 
and boiler and machinery]) from 1989 were added together to match the pre-1989 line 1E (farm- 
owner’s multiple peril, homeowner’s multiple peril, commercial multiple peril, ocean marine, air- 
craft [all perils], and boiler and machinery). The remaining lines of insurance (workers’ compensa- 
tion, medical malpractice, and other liability) were the same for both years, differing only by part 
designation within the schedule. Before 1989, the part designations were 1B (other liability),  1C 
(medical malpractice), and 1D (workers’ compensation). In 1989, the designations were 1D (work- 
ers’ compensation), 1F (medical malpractice), and 1H (other liability). 
The lines are arranged in order of length of tail. Thus, the shortest-tailed line 
is the category miscellaneous, and the longest-tailed line is the category medi- 
cal malpractice. We have used these line designations to organize the descrip- 
tive statistics in table 7.2, which is meant to provide a general picture of the 
total property-casualty market, specifically, of how much of the overall market 
is represented by each line of insurance. 
Another way of illustrating the differing tail lengths, and the actual pattern 
of loss payments, for various lines is to use loss profiles. In table 7.3, we pro- 
vide the standard loss profiles, for all five lines, that have been promulgated by 
the Treasury Department to be used in computing discounted loss reserves, as 
required by TRA86. The columns show, for each line, the assumed percentage 
of the incurred losses (and loss expenses) that have been paid by the end of the 
year specified in the row, relative to the accident year. The figures in boldface 
type indicate the years in which the year-to-year change in paid losses exceeds 
4 percent of the total. Thus, table 7.3 displays clearly the different lengths of 
tails of the five lines. Table 7.4 shows the implied average time to payout for 
each line. 
Table 7.5 shows the “loss ratios” for the industry, by line by accident year. 
The loss ratio is simply the ratio of incurred losses (including loss-adjustment 
expense) to earned premiums.  Because of  the deferral of  payout under the 
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5,3  16,464 
139,590,056 
80  36,522,008  14 
89  83,733,227  32 
82  67,077,085  26 
83  53,819,285  21 
124  19,560,549  8 
86  260,7 12,154  100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
Note: RY  = reporting year. AY  = accident year. 284  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 7.3  Treasury-Specified Loss Profiles, 1988, by Line 
MI  AU  wc  OL  MM 
AY  + 0 
AY  + 1 
AY  + 2 
AY  + 3 
AY  + 4 
AY  + 5 
AY  + 6 
AY  + 7 
AY  + 8 
AY  + 9 
AY  + 10 
AY  + 11 
AY  + 12 
AY  + 13 
AY  + 14 

















































































Source: Treasury Department regulations. Table extended beyond AY  + 10 according to Treasury 
rule of thumb and truncated at AY  + 15. 
Note: Figures given in boldface type indicate the years in which the year-to-year change in paid 
losses exceeds 4 percent of the total. AY  = accident year. 
Table 7.4  Average Time to Payout, by Line 











Source: Authors’ calculations on data from Besrk Aggregates and Averages (1988). 
than those of  the short-tailed lines!  (The reference in the table to the “post- 
1988” lines relates to the way the statistics are presented in the annual reports; 
the aggregation of  policies used  in this table differs from the standard de- 
scribed in table 7.1 in that automobile liability is split into two lines, private 
passenger and commercial automobile.) 
We  should point out that there is an element of apples and oranges in table 
7.5. For the earlier accident years and especially the shorter-tailed lines in 
those years, the loss ratios are effectively the final result. That is, the loss ratios 
can be understood to be no longer an estimate or prediction of future loss pay- 
4. For an extended discussion of the determinants of equilibrium premiums, see Bradford and 
Logue (1998). 285  The Influence of  Income Tax Rules on Insurance Reserves 
Table 7.5  Loss Ratios by Accident Year (using post-1988 lines of insurance) 
Homeowner’s1  Workers’  Other  Medical 
Accident  Farmowner’s  Private  Commercial  Compensation  Liability  Malpractice 










































































































Source: Best S  Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
outs over premiums earned but rather an accounting of past payouts over pre- 
miums earned. For the later accident years, however, especially the longer- 
tailed lines in those years, the loss ratios continue to have a substantial element 
of uncertainty; thus, those ratios continue to be, to a substantial extent, in the 
nature of forecasts. 
7.3  Tax Incentives Bearing on Reserves 
As discussed above, when an insurance company writes a policy, it acquires, 
in addition to a right to receive a premium payment or series of such payments, 
an obligation to make a stream of future loss payments (dependent on contin- 
gencies). For the purpose of computing its annual underwriting income, the 
insurer starts with premiums accrued during the year. From this amount is de- 
ducted the amount of accrued premiums not yet earned (because they are for 
coverage to be provided in the next year); these accrued premiums are added 
to the “unearned premium reserve account,” and to this amount is added the 
amount of premiums accrued in the past but earned in the current year, which 
premiums are subtracted from the unearned-premium-reserve account. (The 
details of the treatment of the unearned-premium-reserve  account in the deriva- 
tion of  taxable income were changed by TRA86. For a discussion, see Brad- 
ford and Logue [1998].) The net result is the “earned-premium’’ income. The 
second major step in determining underwriting income for a given reporting 
period is the deduction for “losses incurred” during the period. This deduction 
consists of two parts: a deduction for the losses that were actually paid during 286  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
the period and a deduction for the increase in the unpaid-losses account (i.e., 
the loss reserves). (Recall that the loss reserves are the losses that the company 
has reason to believe have been incurred but have not yet been paid.) 
With the passage of time, that is, as the insurer moves from one reporting 
year to the next, the insurer accumulates information about the policies that it 
has written in each accident year. As indemnity payments are made under those 
policies, the insurer shifts losses from the “unpaid” to the “paid” accounts. In 
addition, the insurer updates its estimates of total losses incurred under those 
policies. These two changes are implemented in the accounts by a combination 
of  a deduction for the losses paid  during the year and a deduction for any 
increase in loss reserves  during the year. The latter is simply the difference 
between  the end-of-current-reporting-year  reserve  and  the  end-of-previous- 
reporting-year reserve. 
To see how this works, consider the case in which, in the current reporting 
year, there is no change in the estimate of the total losses incurred for a given 
past accident year-call  it “accident year X.”  In  such a case, the unpaid loss 
account (loss reserves)  will be reduced by  the amount of loss expense paid 
during the year. Therefore, the deduction for losses paid  during the current 
reporting year with respect to accident year X  will be exactly offset by a neg- 
ative  deduction  for  the  change  in  reserves.  Because  the  end-of-current- 
reporting-year  reserve  for accident  year  X  will  be  lower  than  the  end-of- 
previous-reporting-year reserve for that accident year by exactly the amount of 
losses paid during the year,  accident year X will have no underwriting-income 
consequences for the current reporting year. 
Now consider the case in which, in the current reporting year, there  is a 
change  in  the estimated  total  loss incurred  with  respect  to a past  accident 
year-again,  call it accident year X. Such a change will result  in a further 
change in the end-of-current-reporting-year loss reserve for that accident year, 
that is, a change in addition to the normal reduction in that reserve to account 
for paid losses. The point can be put more generally. If, in the current reporting 
year, an insurer increases its estimate of total incurred losses for a given acci- 
dent year (i.e., the insurer strengthens that accident-year reserve), there will be 
a corresponding deduction from income in that reporting year in precisely the 
amount of  the  strengthening, holding all else constant. The flip side is also 
true. If the insurer reduces its estimate of total incurred losses for a given ac- 
cident year (a reserve weakening), there will be a corresponding inclusion in 
income for that reporting year. 
Thus, the sequence of  deductions and inclusions in income that must be 
made by  an insurer with respect to the loss side of  any insurance policy  is 
identical to the sequence of adjustments to the losses-incurred account for that 
policy-which,  recall, represents the estimated total  loss (paid and unpaid) 
with respect to that policy. Of course, the first time that the losses incurred for 
a given accident year in a given line show up in the insurer’s accounts is at the 
end of the accident year. That would be the only year in which the accident 287  The Influence of Income Tax Rules on Insurance Reserves 
year and the reporting year overlap. After that, any net deduction or inclusion 
in a given reporting year with respect to a given accident year would be the 
result of a revision in the total incurred losses for that accident year. If there is 
a fixed point in this sequence of adjustments, it would be when enough time 
has passed so that all liabilities with respect to an accident line and year are 
finally settled and the final losses-incurred number is known. Working back 
from that point, any variation in the incurred-loss estimate at the end of the 
previous reporting year results in offsetting changes in the income in the two 
adjoining reporting years. 
So, whether intentional or not, an overstatement of total incurred losses at 
the end of the next-to-last reporting year results in a deduction from that year’s 
income that is balanced by an equal extra inclusion in income in the last re- 
porting year. This is the mechanical result of the income calculation: deduction 
of the sum of losses paid during the year and the excess of the end-of-year loss 
reserve (zero in the last year) over the end-of-previous-year loss reserve. The 
same reasoning applies as one works back from year to year. A decision to 
overstate loss reserves by one dollar in one year implies-other  things, includ- 
ing future loss reserves, equal-a  reduction in this year’s income by a dollar 
and the addition of a dollar to the following year’s income. 
To  this point in the analysis, we have assumed that loss reserves are not 
discounted to present value. In the case of discounted reserves, the analysis is 
slightly different. In this case, a one-dollar overstatement of  reserves in one 
reporting year produces an extra deduction of less than a dollar in that year, 
namely, the discounted value of the future payment implied by the addition to 
total estimated payouts.s Consequently, adding a dollar to the total incurred- 
loss estimate in a year results in a deduction from income in that year of some 
amount less than a dollar. As in the undiscounted case, however, a reduction in 
this year’s income by a dollar implies-other  things, including future loss re- 
serves, equal-the  addition of  a dollar to the following year’s income. The 
deferral effect of overstatement is the same, but the deferral per dollar of  over- 
statement is reduced, relative to the undiscounted case. 
The tax and accounting-income consequences of the choice of  stated re- 
serves in a given reporting year can thus be fully summarized by the implica- 
tions for the income calculations in that year and in the next year. To determine 
the tax incentive to add a dollar to the incurred-loss estimate in a year, we 
therefore need to know the tax rate applicable in the adjacent years as well as 
an estimate of the discount rate applied by companies to variation in the cash 
flow due to changes in the tax liabilities in the adjacent years. 
The incentive bearing on the reserving decision depends on the company’s 
anticipation of future tax rates. The rate applicable to a given company will 
5. The factor by which undiscounted reserves are multiplied to get discounted reserves depends 
on the profile of  remaining payments to be made under a policy. It will tend to be larger the later 
in the life of a policy. However, if the payment profile is “humped,” the factor applicable to a given 
line and accident year could actually decline from one year to the next. 288  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 7.6  Anticipated Federal Income Tax Rates 
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Source: Commerce Clearing House (1996, vol. 1, sec. 3265,0129-,0139). 
depend on its particular circumstances as well as the tax law. For the case of a 
company that is continually subject to tax at the full tax rate, the variation in 
taxes depends on the statute. Statutory corporate tax rates have changed from 
time to time. Sometimes tax legislation specifies the future course of tax rates. 
For purposes of  this exercise, we  assume that companies know  the tax rate 
applicable in the current reporting year and for future years believe the tax 
rates specified in legislation as of the end of  the current reporting year. Table 
7.6 sets out the tax rates used in our calculations for each year.6 
To calculate the net benefit from deferral, we require a discount rate. In table 
7.7, we have used the yield, after taxes, on one-year Treasury bonds to deter- 
mine the addition to the after-tax bottom line in a given year of adding a dollar 
to loss reserves (holding future reserves constant). Thus, the tax  payoff  to 
insurers of overstating reserves has generally been a function of prevailing in- 
terest rates and of  anticipated reductions in tax rates. The overstatement pay- 
offs in 1986 and 1987, for example, were notably high by historical standards 
($0.07 and $0.06 per dollar, respectively) owing to the anticipated reduction in 
corporate tax rates. 
Given the assumptions about insurers’ expectations regarding tax rates and 
6. Logue (1996) explores the possibility that tax-rate changes may  have been anticipated by 
insurers before 1986 and so influenced their behavior at an earlier point. Table 1.7  Tax Deferral Gain Due to One Extra Reserve Dollar 
~~  ~  ~ 
Before-Tax  After-Tax  Current Value of  Present-Value Payoff 
Reporting  Discount  Tax  Saving  Extra Tax  Interest  Interest  Next Year’s  per Extra Dollar 
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Source: Interest rates, Federal Reserve Board data, gopher://gopher.town.hall.org/other/fed/h~l5;  discount factors as described in Bradford and Logue (1998). 
Note:  One-year interest rates are the simple arithmetic means of one-year Treasury bond yields during the year. The 1986 row refers to strengthening of past years. 
The factor for 1985 ignores the fresh-start rule (see the text). The discount factors after 1986 are the simple average of the 1987 factors for AY  + 0 to AY  + 10. 
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interest rates in table 7.6, the overstatement payoff described in table 7.7 would 
apply to any reserving decisions except those affected by the fresh-start rule. 
The fresh start changes the story. For those reserves to which the fresh start was 
expected by  insurers to apply, the reserve-overstatement payoff  was increased 
beyond the amounts described in table 7.7. To  what reserves might insurers 
have plausibly expected the fresh start to apply? TRA86 specifically provides 
that the fresh start applies to all property-casualty reserves outstanding as of 
the end of 1986, with the following exception: it does not apply to any reserve 
strengthening reported in  1986. Thus, for any reserve strengthening made in 
1986, the analysis in table 7.7 would apply. But the analysis is different for 
any new policies written in 1986 and (to the extent that companies anticipated 
TRA86’s introduction of  discounted reserves and of the fresh-start rule) any 
new policies written in (or strengthening reported in) 1985 or earlier. 
Under the fresh-start rule, for example, the present value of  one dollar of 
reserve overstatement in the 1986 tax year for the 1986 accident year depends 
on the line of insurance. This is because the effect of  the rule is to offset a 
deduction of a dollar in 1986 with an inclusion of the discount factor in 1987. 
The discount factor is larger the longer the tail of  the insurance in question 
(because the payments are more distant in  the future). Therefore, the tax- 
reducing value of an extra dollar of reserves is larger for the longer-tailed lines. 
Table 7.8 spells out the details. The fresh-start rule substantially increased the 
incentive to overstate reserves in 1986 (for policies covering 1986), compared 
with the incentives resulting from the declining tax-rate effect taken by itself. 
For medical malpractice, for example, an  extra dollar of  reserves on a new 
policy, holding constant the end-of- 1987 reserves, was worth the equivalent of 
$0.19 in after-tax income in 1986. A comparable incentive applied to reserves 
for accident years 1985 and earlier at the end of the 1985 reporting year, to the 
extent that the fresh-start rule was anticipated then. 
It is easy to become confused about the various tax incentives. To  review, 
the incentive effect of the change in tax rates applied to all reserves at the end 
of 1986 and 1987. Strictly speaking, the rate reductions for 1987 and 1988 did 
not imply any extra incentive to add to reserves in 1985 since the same benefit 
could be obtained by strengthening reserves in 1986. (If strengthening reserves 
is itself costly, for example, if it attracts extra regulatory scrutiny, then the extra 
payoff to reserves at the end of 1986 would have an indirect incentive effect on 
reserving in 1985 or even earlier.) The incentive effect owing to the fresh-start 
rule (combined with the rate-change effect) applied to new reserves established 
during 1986 (i.e., to reserves for policies covering accident year  1986). The 
fresh-start effect also had a direct effect on the incentive to add to reserves (for 
all accident years) at the end of 1985 to the extent that the new tax policy was 
anticipated. In this case, the extraordinary tax benefit was the result of carrying 
the higher reserves into 1987. 
Table 7.9 gives an idea of the magnitudes involved in the fresh-start rule as 
it affected losses incurred in 1986. (For a discussion of the predicted effect of Table 7.8  Gain from an Extra Dollar of Reserves of New Policies in 1986: The Effect of the Fresh-Start Rule 
Current Value of  Payoff per 
Discount  Tax Saving  Extra Tax  Before-Tax  After-Tax  Next Year’s  Extra Dollar 
Line  Factor  This Year  Next Year  Interest Rate  Interest Rate  Extra Tax  of  Reserves 
MI  39  .46  .36  6.46  3.87 
AL  .89  .46  .36  6.46  3.87 
wc  .81  .46  .32  6.46  3.87 
OL  .77  .46  .3  1  6.46  3.87 
MM  .69  .46  .28  6.46  3.87 
.34 
.34 








Sources: Interest rates, Federal Reserve Board data, gopher://gopher.town.hall.org/other/fed/h-15;  discount factors as described in Bradford and Logue (1998). 
Nore:  One-year interest rates are the simple arithmetic means of one-year Treasury bond yields. The discount factors are the simple average of the 1987  factors for 
AY  + 0 to AY  + 10. (AY = accident year.) 
Table 7.9  Losses Incurred in 1986 and Fresh Start (loss reserves for accident year 1986, reported in 1986, amount reported in thousands) 
Estimated Saving from 
Reserves for  Premiums  Loss Incurred  Payoff to Extra  Estimated Saving Due  10% Increase in 
AY  1986  at  Earned for  inAY 1986  Dollar of  to Fresh-Start Rule  Incurred-Loss Estimate 
Year-End 1986  AY  1986  Reported in 1986  Reserves (%)  (col. 1 x col. 4)  (10% of col. 3  x col. 4) 
Line  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
MI  9,705.8  12  32,284,3  13  19,206,09  1  12 
AL  23,500,447  41,133,219  33,550,013  12 
WC  12.01 9,927  19,039,001  15,376,597  15 
OL  11,841,432  16,188,897  12,262,955  16 
MM  3,450,089  3,509,158  3,500,588  19 













Source: Authors’ calculations based on Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
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the fresh-start rule on premiums, assuming no variation in any tax-induced bias 
in reported loss reserves, see Bradford and Logue [1998].) 
An implication of this analysis of the tax incentives bearing on the reserving 
decision is that, apart from 1986 and possibly for strengthening in 1985, the 
marginal payoff  to an extra dollar of  reserves is the same for all  lines and 
accident years. That is, with the exception of the fresh-start effect, any differ- 
ence in tax-motivated reserving behavior from line to line or accident year to 
accident year must be related to the differences in the regulatory, financial, and 
other nontax consequences of variation in the reported loss reserves. 
7.4  Reserving Seen in Industry Data 
Industry  aggregate data are  suggestive of  behavior  consistent with  tax- 
influenced reserving. Figures 7.1-7.5  attempt to capture the pattern of  reserve 
strengthening that occurred in the various lines (running from short to long 
tailed). The graphs show the ratio of  (a)  the incurred loss estimate at the end 
of each year after the accident year to (b)  the estimate at the end of the accident 
year (i.e., the first reported figure). All the curves start at one. A rising link in 
a curve indicates that the reserve for the given accident year was strengthened 
in the reporting year in question. In that sense, it means that the accident-year 
reserve was understated in the prior year. A falling link in a curve indicates 
reserve weakening for that accident year in the reporting year in question. In 
that sense, it means that the accident-year reserve was overstated in the prior 




Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Best 5. Aggregares and Averages (various years). 
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Fig. 7.3  Incurred-loss  estimates by years since accident year: WC 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Best S  Aggregates and Averages (various years). Fig. 7.4  Incurred-loss estimates by years since accident year: OL 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
Fig. 7.5  Incurred-loss estimates by years since accident year: MM 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years). 295  The Influence of Income Tax Rules on Insurance Reserves 
accident years, rising links corresponding to reporting years 1985 and later. 
For the 1986 and 1987 accident years, and for 1985 to the extent that the re- 
striction on the fresh-start rule was anticipated, one would expect that a tax- 
induced overstatement of  initial reported losses incurred, followed by  subse- 
quent reserve weakening (downward links) as the policies matured toward their 
ultimate payout. For accident years 1988 and later, one might expect a rever- 
sion to something like the pattern of earlier years. 
Since the incurred losses are subject to considerable uncertainty, it is not 
possible to draw conclusions from the industry data with great confidence. The 
pictures, however, appear broadly consistent with the description just given. In 
the 1986 accident year, especially in the long-tailed lines (see figs. 7.4 and 7.5), 
there is a substantial shift in the downward direction in the curves-suggesting 
overstatement of the initial 1986 reserves that subsequently required weaken- 
ing. Note also the 1985 accident year for the long-tailed lines. That is the first 
accident year to show a substantial change in reserving direction; that is, al- 
though the  1985 reserves ultimately had to be strengthened, they had to be 
strengthened by considerably less than the 1984 accident-year reserves. Until 
1985, the degree of  strengthening in the long-tailed lines had been increasing 
for several years. 
The picture after 1987 is less obviously consistent with our hypothesis. We 
would have expected the reserves in those years, when the tax incentive was 
no longer so strong, to return to the pre-1986 patterns. But that did not happen. 
The post-1987 accident-year reserves were, like the  1986 reserve, initially 
overstated (thus the downward character in the curves). There is no obvious 
tax-related explanation for this trend. For some reason, over the course of one 
or two years, the property-casualty insurance industry became more conserva- 
tive in its reserving decisions, and, what is difficult to explain (at least from a 
tax-avoidance perspective), the change in this tendency stuck. One possible 
explanation is that, putting aside the temporary tax incentive to overstate re- 
serves created by the fresh-start rule, there was generally a greater incentive to 
overstate reserves  after TRA86 than  before  simply because, after the  act, 
property-casualty insurers had more taxable income. That is, before the act, 
because of the undiscounted reserving, among other things, the insurance in- 
dustry in the aggregate had relatively little taxable income anyway, whereas, 
after the act, the industry had considerably more income that was potentially 
ta~able.~  Another possibility, of  course, is  that-for  reasons unrelated to 
taxes-insurers  became more conservative in their estimates of loss reserves. 
Table  7.10 attempts  to  capture the extent of  conservatism in the initial 
incurred-loss report in the form of the ratio of the report five years later to the 
initial report. So, for example, according to the table, the incurred loss figure 
for automobile liability for accident year 1985 was up by 7 percent at the end of 
1990, relative to the initially announced level. Relatively high numbers mean 
7. For further discussion of  this possibility, see Logue (1996). 296  David F.  Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
Table 7.10  Incurred-Loss  Estimates Five Years Out (summary: ratio of losses, 
report 5 to report 1) 
Accident 



































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BestS Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
1 
Fig. 7.6  Loss estimates five years out: ratio to initial estimates 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Besr k Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
relatively low initial reserves. Particularly for the long-tailed lines, there ap- 
pears to be a break at 1986. Figure 7.6 displays the same information graphi- 
cally. 
Table 7.11 presents data on the extent of reserve strengthening (relating to 
past accident years) in reporting years 1983-94. Each cell reports, for that re- 
porting year, the average over the five most recent accident years of the ratio of Table 7.11  Average Year-to-Year Increase in Incurred-Loss Reports, Reporting Years 1983-94 
Line  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
MI  .02  .12  .13  .09  .08  .04  .04  .oo  .oo  .oo  -.01  -  .05 
AL  -.01  .oo  .05  .01  .02  .01  .o 1  .oo  -.01  -  .04  -  .04  -  .05 
wc  -  .05  .oo  .01  .04  .04  .06  .03  .04  .06  .05  .oo  .05 
OL  .01  .08  .ll  .I0  .09  .04  .03  .oo  -  .03  -  .05  -  .04  .08 
MM  .03  .06  .26  .08  .02  .02  .08  -  .08  -  .08  -  .05  -.08  -  .09 
Average  .oo  .05  .ll  .06  .05  .03  .04  -.Ol  -.Ol  -  .02  -  .03  -.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years). 
Nore: Cells show average for the five most recent accident years of the fractional increase in the sum of  paid and unpaid losses. (For 1983, three accident years are 
included and, for 1984, four accident years.) 298  David F. Bradford and Kyle D. Logue 
the increase in the total incurred loss estimate (i.e., the sum of paid and unpaid 
losses) to its previous level. (Because the data extend back only to 1980, for 
1983 three past years are accounted for, and for 1984 four past years are ac- 
counted for.) Finally, we have noted that the incentive to strengthen reserves 
on past accident years was strongest in  1985 to the extent that the fresh-start 
rule was anticipated. Otherwise, the incentive effects of the tax-rate changes 
from 1985 to 1986 and from 1986 to 1987 reflected in table 7.7 above apply. 
The bottom line of the table presents the simple averages of the averages. Here, 
one sees a pattern generally consistent with the influence of the tax incentives, 
including something of a reversion to roughly zero strengthening in the more 
recent years. 
7.5  Concluding Comments 
In this paper, we have explained how the federal income tax rules, and espe- 
cially changes in those rules, have combined with financial market circum- 
stances (interest rates) to create incentives bearing on property-casualty insur- 
ers’ decisions regarding the level of loss reserves to report. We find that these 
incentives have varied substantially over time. In particular, transition effects 
due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 created unusually large incentives to over- 
state reserves in reporting years  1985-87.  We would emphasize that, because 
they amount to forecasts of quite variable quantities, reserves are inevitably 
subject to correction over time. Furthermore, taxes are not the only sources of 
biasing incentives that may vary from time to time. Still, the picture in aggre- 
gate industry data that we have assembled is broadly consistent with the tax- 
motivated reserving hypothesis. In work in progress, we hope to tease addi- 
tional insights about reserving from the quantitative record. 
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Comment  Ross J. Davidson Jr. 
When Ken Froot asked me to discuss this paper, I was quick to remind him 
that I am neither a reserving actuary nor a tax expert. He was either desperate 
for another discussant or thought that my involvement in capital management, 
financial exposure management, and insurance reguIatory capital issues over 
the past few years could add a unique perspective to this topic. 
But I must admit to an agenda in agreeing to discuss this paper. I am cur- 
rently coordinating the Technical Advisory Group to the National Association 
of  Insurance Commissioners  (NAIC) Catastrophe Reserve  Subgroup.  This 
group is composed of approximately forty individuals who represent insurers, 
insurance brokers, catastrophe-modeling firms, investment banks, accounting, 
legal, and actuarial firms, and federal government agencies. They are a collec- 
tion of very talented people, with broadly ranging expertise in actuarial sci- 
ence, tax, accounting, economics, capital markets, and state and federal regula- 
tory affairs. We are charged with advising a group of state regulatory officials 
who represent the NAIC on the rationale,  appropriate design, economic ef- 
fects, and implementation of a reserve for future catastrophes. Annual addi- 
tions to this reserve would be deductible for federal tax purposes, and draw- 
downs against the reserve would flow into taxable income, allowing smoothing 
of insurer results. Since this reserve is intended to provide insurers with incen- 
tives to write catastrophe coverage in hazard-prone areas while improving the 
financial strength of such insurers, I have more than a casual interest in any 
study that seeks to gauge the effect of changes in tax law on insurance reserv- 
ing practices. The question is, Will the desired market and capital retention 
behavior be induced by tax incentives? Alternatively, if a reserve is mandated, 
can it be designed to be an efficient mechanism? 
In fact, before I read Bradford and Logue’s paper, I expected that it might 
be an answer to my prayers. The fundamental premise that income tax rules 
could influence reserving practices is closely related to the premise that reserv- 
ing requirements that include tax incentives could influence an insurer’s deci- 
sions to write hazard insurance. In fact, the very techniques by which Bradford 
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and Logue sought to ferret out past behaviors induced by  tax-law changes 
could form the basis of predictive behavior models that could help shape and 
direct the debate on reserving practices that  include tax  incentives. What’s 
more, maybe after our discussion more of you will want to develop a method 
to predict the influences on market behavior and financial strength of  tax- 
deductible catastrophe reserves. As we have seen, Howard Kunreuther and the 
Wharton school are beginning to build some of the infrastructure models for 
such a project. 
Now,  more to the topic of  the paper, I will not seek to comment on the 
elegance of the formulas or the correctness of the statistical analysis or even 
the authors’ attempts to deal with imperfections in or paucity of the data, but I 
will attempt to address the relevance of the paper and its conclusions to insur- 
ance management and regulation and will point out some dimensions of the 
paper that, if broadened, might be useful to practitioners. 
Occasionally, I look at the last page of a book before I begin reading it. This 
has the risk of being like eating dessert first. It can stimulate the taste buds, but 
the rest of the meal may seem somewhat pedestrian. But I must say that, when 
I read the conclusion of this paper first, I did not have that experience. In fact, 
I found the reading of  the paper, the main course if you will, to be far more 
satisfying than the conclusion (the hoped-for dessert). Remember the feeling 
you get when you’re engrossed in an intense television program (maybe your 
favorite soap or “Star Trek” mutant) that seems to be approaching the climatic 
scene, only to see to be continued appear on the screen. I relived that feeling as 
I read the conclusion of this paper. To paraphrase, while from an industrywide 
perspective some tax-induced reserving behavior can be detected, other influ- 
ences may in fact be causing the observed behavior. Moreover, the jury is still 
out on how to adequately measure the tax-incentive-influenced behavior of in- 
dustry sectors or individual insurers with different tax characteristics. Admit- 
tedly, this is a very complicated subject that must be simplified. However, any 
tax-motivated behavior must be evaluated in balance with other important non- 
tax factors that influence management decisions. As the authors continue their 
exploration, I encourage them to evaluate the influence and correlation of some 
of the following factors on past and future reserving behavior. 
Effect of Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
This change in the tax law had a profound effect on property and casualty 
insurers and may even have modulated any reserving behavior influenced by tax 
incentives. Before AMT, varying the mix of taxable and tax-exempt investment 
income was a dominant tax-minimization strategy. After AMT, property and 
casualty insurers could no longer use investment mix as a dominant tool to mini- 
mize taxable income. With the AMT, many property-casualty insurers became 
taxpayers for the first time, and, having their options limited, they may have 
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The Uncertainty Factor 
As I collected comments on the paper from USAA’s reserving actuary, she 
reminded me that her job is not all science. A significant amount of uncertainty 
is involved in reserve estimation, especially for the long tail lines that seem to 
have demonstrated some evidence of change in the target period. New develop- 
ments in cost and litigation can often dramatically change perceptions and give 
the impression that someone may have been cooking the books when in fact 
more information had led to a different expectation of loss development. 
Changes in development of claims on other liability, especially environmen- 
tal and asbestos claims during the 1980s, are a good example. Around the same 
time as the 1986 tax act, there were dramatic changes in the perception of in- 
surers writing these coverages as to the development of claims. Many insurers 
were adding massive amounts to their reserves as the specter of increased costs 
of litigation and recovery loomed. Another example is the effect on medical 
malpractice claims of recent lower health care costs and a trend to a less liti- 
gious environment. 
The Effect of the Competitive Cycle and Interest Rates 
and Inflation on Underwriting 
The early to mid-1980s were years of dramatic change in interest rates and 
inflation, both of which greatly affect profitability. The transition out of  high 
inflation and interest rates to lower rates caused many insurers to reevaluate 
the role of underwriting results in the profitability equation. If insurers were 
prone to use the underwriting component to smooth earnings, they would have 
found the mid-1980s to be an especially tempting time to do so. 
The Limited Opportunity for Undetected Reserve Manipulation in 
Short-Tail Lines like Automobile Liability, Homeowner’s, and Marine 
Because of their relatively short development life cycle, these lines may not 
have allowed for enough flexibility for undetected tax-incentive-influenced re- 
serving variations. Longer tail lines do, owing to the sheer larger number of 
years that it takes you or others to know if you were wrong. 
The Complex and Dynamic Regulatory Scene 
Regulators use many more tools than the premium-to-surplus ratio to deter- 
mine the financial health of their regulated companies. In fact, they look care- 
fully at the development of reserves, believing that most insurers are habitually 
underreserved. The fact that an insurer strengthened reserves may play more 
heavily on a regulator’s view of  the financial strength of  an insurer than is 
credited by  the authors. The NAIC has a couple of  sets of  ratios, some of 
which more directly go to the point of reserve adequacy. Financial hazardous 
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to intervene in a company’s management if negative trends develop in income, 
surplus, liabilities, etc. 
More recently, the advent of risk-based capital has become more important 
than the surplus liquidity ratio, although its effect may be relatively similar to 
the premium-to-surplus ratio. 
Rating Agency and Stock Analysts’ Perceptions 
Are Not Exclusively Based on Earnings 
Like regulators, rating agencies and stock analysts are just as interested and 
were maybe uniformly more sophisticated in the 1980s in assessing the ade- 
quacy of reserves in the capital sufficiency equation. 
While the authors note in their conclusion that the measures they explored 
and the data set that they used did not lend themselves well to effective in- 
sector analysis, nonetheless there are fairly significant differences in how seg- 
ments of the property-casualty  industry might behave. Some of those include 
the following: 
Stock and Nonstock Insurers. Insurers organized as stockholder-held entities 
are driven by different motives. They seek to please Wall Street, are more in- 
clined to shorter-term tactical decisions, and may view reported earnings with 
a higher priority than nonstocks. Having worked for both types of organiza- 
tions in my career, I can testify to the vast difference. 
Capital Rich and Capital Poor Insurers. This can be a major motivator since 
those insurers that may be perceived  as having too much capital will tend to 
try to reserve robustly and be less sensitive to tax-law changes. 
Large and Small Insurers. Some insurers write only in one state and as a result 
are not  affected as much by  national insurance regulatory  schemes such as 
the NAIC. 
Another effect to be considered is the dominance of  one or a few insurers in 
the data. In industry studies, we have found that State Farm and several other 
insurers dominate the outcome of any industry trends. Techniques to normalize 
for size of insurers seem to yield vastly different results. 
Back to “AS the World firns’’ 
I believe that the exploration done here may form the basis of very important 
research as the national debate on catastrophe management begins to consider 
tax-incentive-influenced reserving for catastrophes. The foundation of that ef- 
fort is that tax incentives will produce behavior on the part of insurers and 
other capital providers that will help deal with solvency and availability issues 
in the hazard-insurance market. 
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can be managed in  a number of ways, the bottom line is that the capital to 
cover these risks must come from somewhere-ultimately  either current or 
future policyholders (the primary risk takers) or current or future taxpayers. 
Tax policy can either support or work against appropriate accumulation and 
allocation of that capital. The current taxation of profits or losses from catastro- 
phe coverage works against the optimal allocation of capital. Even the carry- 
back and carryforward rules intended to allow for temporal variation of results 
are inadequate to deal with the time frames that we encounter in managing 
exposures to megacatastrophes.  Catastrophe reserves must fit into the over- 
all framework of  capital for catastrophe-management  tools. A good balance 
must be struck with other capital resources. 
One implication of these points is that tax policy must be used very carefully 
when attempting to modify capital accumulation and allocation behavior. 
If the techniques explored in this paper for ferreting out tax-motivated his- 
torical behavior can be refined and applied prospectively to predict future tax- 
incentive-influenced behavior, the nation will have been well served in the up- 
coming debate on tax-deductible  catastrophe reserves. I hope that the script 
of the next episode in this to-be-continued development will address these is- 
sues. I also hope that many of  you will be similarly inspired to explore this 
new and exciting frontier. It may help us practitioners carry the catastrophe- 
management ball a little farther down the field. 
Comment  James R. Hines Jr. 
This paper offers a very readable description of the U.S. tax treatment of insur- 
ance loss reserves, which is a significant accomplishment, and goes on to ana- 
lyze the industry’s reactions to the incentives introduced by  the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. The evidence is consistent with an important effect of tax incen- 
tives on loss-reserve accounting, although the available data are so limited that 
it is difficult to measure precisely the magnitude of the effect. Nevertheless, 
the notion that insurers adjust their loss reserves in response to changes in tax 
incentives is consistent with other well-documented aspects of firm behavior 
and is of sufficient importance to be worthy of careful investigation. 
The nature of  the insurance industry makes income measurement particu- 
larly challenging, which in turn makes the taxation of its income a very diffi- 
cult exercise. The arcane and somewhat arbitrary tax rules that Bradford and 
Logue describe are required in order to implement a system that attempts to 
tax the annual flow of income in a line of business in which one year’s activities 
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generate a stream of future liabilities the present value of which is highly un- 
certain. Since the 1977 publication of Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, David 
Bradford has been a leading proponent of replacing the income tax with a con- 
sumption tax, maintaining that the consumption tax is not only more efficient 
than an income tax but also easier to administer. Bradford's recent work in- 
cludes careful descriptions of  various complex parts of  the Internal Revenue 
Code that are always to the point but that also always subtly remind the reader 
of the tangled web that an income tax represents (see, e.g., Bradford 1986; and 
Ault and Bradford 1990). This paper falls squarely in that tradition. 
It is instructive to consider the incentives facing those in the insurance indus- 
try who select loss-reserve levels for their firms. Firms generally have tax in- 
centives to overstate their loss reserves even in the absence of legislative transi- 
tions such as those introduced by  the  1986 act. Increasing reserves reduces 
present taxable income by  the same amount that it increases future taxable 
income. This is a profitable exercise as long as there is a positive time value to 
money. The uniformly positive numbers that appear in the rightmost column 
of Bradford and Logue's table 7.7 in part reflect this incentive. In an extreme 
case, a firm with carte blanche to select its loss reserve level can, by increasing 
the loss reserve sufficiently each year, reduce to zero its tax liability in every 
period. 
What prevents taxable firms from greatly increasing their loss-reserve levels 
and enjoying the accompanying tax benefits? It is probably the case that several 
considerations conspire to prevent them from doing so. The first of  these is 
oversight by  the Internal Revenue Service, which can disallow unwarranted 
deductions and which can make life unpleasant for taxpayers deemed to have 
taken unwarranted deductions. The second is oversight by  shareholders and 
bondholders, who may have difficulty distinguishing tax-motivated reserve in- 
creases from those that reflect true economic risks to the firm. As a result, share 
values, bond ratings, and managerial compensation may fall in reaction to an- 
nouncements of higher loss-reserve levels. The third is oversight by state regu- 
lators, who are concerned about the relative magnitudes of assets and liabilities 
and who may also interpret higher loss-reserve levels as reflecting greater lia- 
bilities. The fourth consideration is professional custom and other human hab- 
its that prevent firms from optimizing on all margins all the time. 
Consequently, the responsiveness of reserve levels to tax changes appears 
against a background in which firms do not fully optimize against the tax sys- 
tem owing to one or more nontax frictions. The inability or unwillingness of 
insurers to adjust their reserve levels to minimize tax liabilities is analogous to 
widely observed behavior in which firms fail to take full advantage of their 
opportunities to overstate their expenses or understate their incomes in order 
to reduce tax liabilities. One example is the choice of inventory-accounting 
method. In the presence of any amount of inflation, firms reduce their tax lia- 
bilities by substituting last-in, first-out for first-in, first-out inventory account- 
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first-in, first-out accounting. A second example concerns the choice of depreci- 
ation method for tax purposes. Accelerated depreciation schedules, when avail- 
able, generally enhance the present value of depreciation allowances-but,  in 
spite of this advantage, they are not universally employed. The case of depre- 
ciation allowances is all the more thought provoking in that there is no re- 
quirement (as there is in the case of inventory accounting  and loss-reserve 
accounting) that the same methods must be used for both tax calculations and 
financial statements. 
In spite of the likely presence of nontax frictions, the loss-reserve behavior 
documented by Bradford and Logue is broadly consistent with the tax incen- 
tives introduced by the 1986 act. Loss reserves rise at the same time that incen- 
tives to overstate them rise, doing so most visibly in the long-tailed lines of 
business in which one would expect to see the strongest reaction. It is, however, 
impossible to draw any strong statistical inferences from the behavior of  a 
sample of just five lines of business around one event date (1986). Further- 
more, the changing legal environment of the mid-1980s that was responsible 
for rising liability awards may itself have encouraged insurers to expand their 
loss reserves in a way that could appear to have been tax motivated. While 
the evidence is highly suggestive of tax-motivated behavior, it simultaneously 
reflects all other secular changes that influence insurance reserves. 
Part  of the attraction of  studying the industry’s reaction to events around 
1986 is that doing so affords insight into the extent to which tax and nontax 
considerations influence reserve levels during unspectacular periods. A finding 
that reserve levels respond dramatically to tax changes in turn suggests that 
reserves are significantly overstated on a chronic basis owing to the tax incen- 
tive that arises from discounting. Since the paper in fact reports evidence that 
reserves react significantly to tax transitions, it follows that reserves in normal 
years typically overstate expected future liabilities. This inference in turn car- 
ries any number of implications for tax and regulatory policy as well as impli- 
cations for the way in which financial markets should react to announcements 
of changes in loss reserves. So there is quite a bit of interesting work to be 
done in addition to this very useful analysis of reactions to the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. 
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